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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JASON SCOTT WILLIAMS : Case No. 950057-CA 
Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2) (a) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief 
or in Addendum A: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 7 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
Utah R. App. P. 4 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(5) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(7) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2) (a) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9.5 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.48.040 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.48.070 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in basing its factual 
findings and legal conclusions on unproven claims and on 
matters outside of the record? "Findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous if it can be shown that they are without adequate 
evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous 
view of the law." Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Smith, 
Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1994); 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) ("trial 
courts do not have discretion to misapply the law"). 
2. Did the trial court misinterpret the rules, 
statutes and constitutional authority governing double 
jeopardy and the single criminal episode statute? "Since 
questions of constitutional rights are questions of law, we 
give no deference to the trial court's conclusion . . . " 
State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991); Gravson 
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 460 (Utah 1989) ("A 
trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular 
deference"); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App.) 
("When examining a trial court's interpretation of a statutory 
provision we apply a correction of error standard"), cert. 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION 
Due to the promulgation of a new rule, Utah R. Crim. 
P. 9.5, which has not been interpreted judicially in Utah, 
Mr. Williams7 single criminal episode issue addresses the 
applicable authority in a manner different from relevant 
precedent. A state constitutional analysis is also being 
advanced for the first time with authorities not previously 
considered on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
attempted theft by receiving, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102(3); 76-6-408; 
76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) . See. (R 6, 8, 21, 99) . On November 17, 
1994, Mr. Jason Scott Williams entered a conditional guilty 
plea to the above offense, reserving his right to appeal the 
involved issues. (R 88-95). 
On December 6,1994, the court sentenced Mr. Williams 
to an indeterminate term "not to exceed five years" in the 
Utah State Prison, together with a $5000 fine. (R 99). The 
sentence was immediately stayed, however, in favor of a 36 
month period of probation. (R 99-100). 
Other procedural facts are in dispute and will be more 
fully set forth in the "Statement of Facts" and "Argument" 
portions of the brief. The filed pleadings included the 
following: On November 18, 1994, the trial court signed 
"Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Denying 
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Defendant's Motion to Dismiss". (R 96-98). "Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law" were later signed by the court 
on January 6, 1995, (R 136-39), following objections and 
proposals by both parties. (R 101-29). After an extension of 
time for filing the notice of appeal, (R 130-31: 152-54); see 
Utah R. App. P. 4(e), Mr. Williams filed this appeal. 
(R 140-41). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 18, 1994, the court first signed "Findings 
of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss", (R 96-98), which read in pertinent part as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 3, 1994, Jason Williams was charged by 
Salt Lake City in a three count information with two counts 
of carrying a loaded firearm, in violation of Salt Lake 
City Ordinance 11.48.040, and one count of carrying a 
concealed weapon, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 
11.40.070 in Salt Lake City v. Jason Williams, case number 
941016768. 
2. He was arraigned on October 4, 1994, and pled to 
one count of carrying a loaded firearm and one count of 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
3. He was sentenced by Judge Pro Tern T. Patrick Casey 
on November 2, 1994. 
4. In this case, the State filed an information on 
October 4, 1994, charging Mr. Williams with theft by 
receiving stolen property, a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-6-4 [10], and carrying a concealed weapon, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-504. 
5. The State subsequently moved to dismiss the count 
alleging carrying a concealed weapon, and the motion was 
granted. 
6. Both cases are premised on facts allegedly 
occurring on October 1, 1994, wherein the police conducted 
a warrantless search of a car containing two loaded 
firearms. 
7. Both cases were filed in the Third Circuit Court 
before Judge Pro Tern T. Patrick Casey. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Because the elements of the offenses in the City 
case are different from the elements of the offense charged 
in the State case, there is no violation of the defendant's 
rights against double jeopardy. 
2. Because the offenses charged in the City case and 
the offense charged in the State case did not occur in the 
same criminal episode, there is no violation of the Utah 
statutes pertaining to prosecutions of single criminal 
episodes. 
(R 96-98) (attached as Addendum B). 
Following objections and proposals to the findings and 
conclusions, on January 6, 1995, the court signed "Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law". (R 136-39); see also 
(R 13 0) (Amended Findings were needed to perfect the appeal). In 
contrast to the initial findings, however, the Amended Findings 
and Conclusions were adopted from the State's unsubstantiated 
oral representations. Compare (R 137-39) (Addendum C), with 
(R 163-39) . 
During the motion to dismiss proceeding for the double 
jeopardy issue, the State attempted to supplement the record with 
nothing more than its oral representations. "There are a couple 
of things I [the State] would like to supplement the record with 
vis-a-vis the facts in this case." (R 163). 
Defense counsel is right, the defendant was charged and 
booked into jail the evening of October the 1st on three 
misdemeanors that are listed in the city's information. 
He was originally booked on a class "A" misdemeanor on 
the concealed weapon in a vehicle, or having a loaded 
weapon in the vehicle. Unfortunately, the jail somehow, in 
its paperwork, listed that as a class "B" misdemeanor. 
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The city prosecutor's office picked it up the next day. 
It was not screened. It was just sent over by the jail; no 
officer screened it. 
And based upon the charges being there, the city 
prosecutor's office issued the information that you have. 
The defendant plead[ed] guilty to that information. On 
approximately the 4th, I believe in front of Judge Casey, 
it was not until the 4th that the weapons showed up on an 
NCIC hit that it was stolen, and it was not until after the 
defendant had already entered his guilty plea that the 
State had knowledge that the gun was stolen. 
So it was not until after those events, and the 
defendant had already entered the guilty plea, that the 
State had any basis to present its charges. 
And as soon as that information was conveyed to the 
officer, he found out it was listed in the NCIC as stolen, 
a stolen gun, he came into my office and we filed the 
second information that the court has before it. 
(R 163-64) . 
The State's claims were immediately challenged. "Some of 
the statements, factual statements, that [the State] made . . . 
are things I'm [defense counsel] not aware of independently, and 
I'm not willing to stipulate to them. I don't know exactly how 
Mr. Williams was booked into the jail. I don't know what the 
jail paperwork situation was. I don't know what the screening 
situation was. All I know is the evidence I submitted to you, 
that the police reports available to the city prosecutor are the 
same as the police reports available to the State in this case." 
(R 167); accord (R 120). 
Despite the defense objections, the trial court adopted the 
State's oral representations. The matters outside of the record 
evidence were incorporated into the Amended Findings and 
Conclusions: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 1, 1994, Detective Kent Cravens of the 
Metro Gang Unit and other police officers responded to a 
shots fired report. Five members of the gangs "QVO" or 
"BMG" were detained by the police officers. The defendant 
was one of the people detained. 
2. A 1981 silver Datsun 310 car was parked nearby. 
The defendant had driven the car to the area. Detective 
Cravens observed a sawed off shotgun in the back seat area 
of the car through the car's rear window. A search of the 
car was performed by Detective Cravens and a loaded .357 
Magnum revolver was found under the driver's floormat. The 
defendant admitted that he was in possession of the .357 
handgun and that the gun was "probably stolen." The .357 
Magnum was not listed on NCIC as stolen at this time. 
3. The defendant received and took possession of the 
.357 handgun before he loaded it and concealed it in his 
vehicle. 
4. The defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt 
Lake County Jail for Possession of a Concealed Weapon and 
Possession of a Loaded Firearm in a Vehicle. Both of these 
charges were misdemeanor Salt Lake City ordinance 
violations. 
5. On October 3, 1994, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's 
Office filed an Information charging Scott Wilkerson, an 
alias of the defendant, with one count of Carrying a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon and two counts of Carrying a 
Loaded Firearm. Both charges are class B misdemeanor 
violations of the city ordinances. 
6. On October 4, 1994, the defendant was arraigned on 
the city charges in front of Judge Pro Tern Patrick Casey 
and pled guilty to one count of Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon and one count of Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm. The third count was dismissed. 
7. On October 4, 1994, Detective Cravens checked the 
NCIC listings again and the .357 Magnum was listed as 
stolen. Detective Cravens screened charges of Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, and 
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a class A 
misdemeanor, with the County Attorney's Office. The County 
Attorney issued an Information charging the defendant with 
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property. 
8. On October 11, 1994, the County Attorney learned 
about the defendant's guilty plea to the city charges and 
dismissed the class A carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon 
charge. 
9. A preliminary hearing was held before Judge Pro Tern 
Patrick Casey on October 18, 1994, and the defendant was 
bound over to the district court on the second degree 
felony charge of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was 
committed and completed when the defendant took possession 
of the stolen .357 Magnum handgun. 
2. The crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon 
and Carrying a Loaded Firearm occurred and were completed 
when the defendant loaded and concealed the .357 Magnum 
handgun in the car that he was driving. 
3\ The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was 
completed before the defendant committed the crimes of 
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm. 
4. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property has 
different elements than the crimes of Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm. 
5. The jurisdiction for the second degree Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property is in the District Court. The 
Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction over the second 
degree felony of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property. 
6. The Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office did not have 
jurisdiction to prosecute the second degree felony Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property charge. Jurisdiction to 
prosecute this offense was only in the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office. 
7. The offense of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property 
was not known to the prosecution at the time that the 
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon charges were filed. 
8. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is 
a separate and distinct crime from the crimes of Carrying a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm. 
9. The defendant was not placed in double jeopardy 
under the clauses of either the Utah State Cons[t]itution 
or the Federal Constitution. 
10. The crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous 
Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm were not committed as 
part of the same criminal episode as the crime of Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property within the meaning of Section 
76-1-402, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended. 
(R 136-39) (attached as Addendum C). 
In line with his prior objections, (R 167-68), Mr. Williams 
filed the following written objections to the Amended Findings 
and Conclusions: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
7. There was no evidence presented regarding when 
Detective Cravens verified that the gun was stolen on NCIC, 
or when he screened the case with the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office. 
8. There was no evidence presented regarding when the 
County Attorney learned about Mr. Williams' plea to the 
city charges. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The crime of theft by receiving property was 
occurring at the same time as the city misdemeanor weapons 
offenses. Both the State and City Informations charge 
October 1, 1994. Both Count I of the information in the 
State case and the probable cause statement refer to the 
facts on October 1, 1994 at 975 South and 3 00 West. 
2. The crime of carrying a loaded firearm was 
occurring on October 1, 1994, the same time as the theft by 
receiving. It appears that the crime of carrying a 
concealed weapon never occurred in this case, inasmuch as 
there is no evidence that Mr. Williams carried the gun on 
his person. Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.48.070. 
3. The crimes alleged in the city and state cases were 
occurring simultaneously on October 1, 1994. 
4. The circuit court magistrates had initial 
jurisdiction over both the city and state charges, and the 
district court had ultimate jurisdiction over the charges 
in both cases. 
5. While the city prosecutor's office had 
discretionary jurisdiction over the city charges, the state 
prosecutor's office had jurisdiction over all charges 
contemplated in the city and state cases. 
6. The prosecution had all the evidence necessary to 
the theft by receiving charge at the time that the other 
misdemeanor charges were filed. 
(R 120-22) (attached as Addendum D). 
Based on his objections and the lack of record evidence, 
the Amended Findings are now challenged as being clearly 
erroneous. See infra Point I. The court's legal conclusions 
are also disputed. (R 67-73; 156-72); Point II. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State did not prove and the evidence did not establish 
many of the factual and legal assertions argued orally by the 
prosecution. Without appropriately admitted supporting 
evidence, the State's oral representations cannot be accepted as 
true. Moreover, the State's claims are clearly erroneous. 
Utah's rules, statutes, and constitutional authority all 
indicate that Mr. Williams was improperly convicted of the same 
act arising out of a single criminal episode. Having already 
accepted responsibility for his admitted involvement, his two 
uncounseled misdemeanor guilty pleas constituted a bar to any 
further prosecutions. Since the same factual contentions and 
police reports were used in a subsequent prosecution, the State 
cannot claim that newly filed charges were justified. The court 
erred in not dismissing a subsequently filed charge which had 
already been resolved in a prior proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS LACKED AN ADEQUATE EVIDENTIARY 
FOUNDATION AND RELIED IMPROPERLY ON MATTERS OUTSIDE OF 
THE RECORD AND UNPROVEN BY THE STATE 
"Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it can be shown 
that they are without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are 
induced by an erroneous view of the law." Interiors Contracting Inc. 
v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 
1994). The standard of review differs, though, where, as here, 
appellate review is of a court's findings and not a jury's verdict: 
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[I]t is not accurate to say that the appellate court 
takes that view of the evidence that is most favorable 
to the appellee, that it assumes that all conflicts in 
the evidence were resolved in his favor, and that he 
must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences. 
All of this is true in reviewing a jury verdict. It is 
not true when it is findings of the court that are 
being reviewed. Instead, the appellate court may 
examine all of the evidence in the record. It will 
presume that the trial court relied only on evidence 
properly admissible in making its finding in the 
absence of a clear showing to the contrary. It must 
given great weight to the findings made and the 
inferences drawn by the trial judge, but it must 
rejects his findings if it considers them to be clearly 
erroneous. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added 
and citation omitted);1 see also id. ("A finding is 'clearly 
erroneous7 when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed"). 
An "adequate evidentiary basis" requires more than 
counsel's oral representations. As explained by this Court in 
Workman v. Nagle Constr., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990): 
Workman's counsel represented at oral argument that 
the condominium owners had actual knowledge of the 
litigation in this case and notice to them would 
therefore have arguably been a mere formality. 
However, there is no evidence in the record to support 
this representation of counsel. While we have no 
particular reason to doubt it, there is nevertheless no 
sufficient evidentiary basis to support a finding that 
the condominium owners had actual knowledge of this 
action, as counsel represented. We therefore lack the 
factual predicate for taking up the issue whether 
i Although Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) provided the basis for the 
quoted standard, "Rule 52(a) applies in criminal cases . . ." 
Walker, 743 P.2d at 192; accord Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 26(7). 
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actual knowledge satisfies the right of the class 
members to notice. 
Workman, 802 P.2d at 753 (emphasis added and footnote omitted); 
accord Redd v. Nealev, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989) (the "belief" 
expressed by counsel provided an inadequate factual basis for an 
objection). 
In the case at bar, the State represented during oral 
argument that it "would like to supplement the record with 
vis-a-vis the facts in this case." (R 163). However, the State 
presented no witnesses in support of its claimed supplementation; 
rather, it simply alleged a different version of the facts in an 
attempt to bolster its argument. (R 163-67). 
In accordance with the marshalling requirement, see, 
e.g., Interiors Contracting, 881 P.2d at 933, Mr. Williams 
momentarily accepts the court's Amended Findings. (R 136-3 9) 
(Addendum C); see supra Statement of Facts. He further assumes, 
as this Court did in Workman, that there is "no particular reason 
to doubt it [counsel's representations]". See 802 P.2d at 753. 
As in Workman, however, such representations by counsel 
nevertheless "lack the [necessary] factual predicate". JEd; (R 
136-39; 163-67). 
"The representation of appellee's counsel that appellee 
had a different version of the facts is not sufficient to support 
the trial court's finding. At best, that representation is 
nothing more than unsworn hearsay and argument of counsel." Van 
Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App. 1991); 
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see also id. at 1339 ("Given the lack of any actual testimony or 
other properly admitted evidence . . . the finding cannot 
stand"); Workman, 802 P.2d at 753. All of the State's oral 
representations, (R 163-70), which in turn served as the basis 
for the Amended Findings and Conclusions, (R 137-39), do not 
satisfy the "adequate evidentiary basis" standard of review. See 
Interiors Contracting Inc., 881 P.2d at 931. 
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, 
the court's Amended Findings cannot stand because they relied 
improperly on the State's unsubstantiated oral representations. 
See Workman, 802 P.2d 749; Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335; Redd, 
785 P.2d 1098; cf. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 
1989) ("counsel is precluded from arguing matters not in 
evidence"). Lacking "adequate evidentiary support", the trial 
court's Amended Findings were clearly erroneous unless otherwise 
designated herein.2 (R 137); Interiors Contracting Inc., 881 
P.2d at 931.3 
2
 The original findings and conclusions signed by the court 
on November 18, 1994, (R 96-98); (Addendum B), should provide the 
framework for this appeal. However, where appropriate, the 
discussion herein will also refer to the Amended findings and 
conclusions. (R 136-39); (Addendum C). 
3
 For similar reasons, the State did not meet its burden of 
proving its contention that "the defendant entered his earlier 
[misdemeanor] plea with the intent to avoid greater punishment." 
(R 81) . Although the State acknowledges that on "the evening he 
was arrested, [Mr. Williams] told the officer that the gun was 
probably stolen[,]" (R 166), the State then inconsistently and 
without any factual support argues "that the defendant knew about 
the possibility of the next [felony] charge coming down the pike 
and entered his [misdemeanor] guilty plea solely to avoid the 
further punishment that the felony charge of possession of stolen 
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POINT II 
THE THEFT BY RECEIVING CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED 
PURSUANT TO UTAH AUTHORITY 
The court's legal conclusions were in error as well, not 
only because of the invalid factual basis, but also because of the 
court's misinterpretion of applicable legal authority. (R 136-39) 
(Addendum C). Mr. Williams begins with Utah's rules and statutes. 
A. THE INVOLVED "ACT" AROSE UNDER A SINGLE 
CRIMINAL EPISODE AND THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ONLY ONE PUNISHMENT 
As explained below, the theft by receiving charge 
should have been dismissed because it stemmed from the same 
criminal episode as his prior convictions for carrying a 
loaded firearm and carrying a concealed weapon. (R 67-73) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402, states in pertinent part: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal 
action for all separate offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode; however, when the same act of 
a defendant under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act 
shall be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other such 
provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (emphasis added). 
property would bring." (R 167). In contrast to its claims, 
however, the State provided no factual evidence in support of its 
argument. Moreover, if Mr. Williams had in fact intended to avoid 
further punishment, he would have benefitted more by admitting 
nothing to the officer because the State then would have lacked 
notice of the "charge coming down the pike." Through his 
admission, though, the State now had notice of both the felony and 
misdemeanor nature of the charges. 
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 'Act7 means a voluntary bodily movement and includes 
speech." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(1). If the same voluntary 
bodily movement "establish[es] offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act 
shall be punishable under only one such provision." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402 (1) . 
For example, in State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 
1983), even though firearms stolen separately in 1980 and in 
1981 were found together in defendant Bair's residence, 
"'retaining' the stolen property of different individuals is but 
a single act and must be prosecuted as only one offense if the 
evidence shows, as it clearly does here, that the retention or 
possession of such stolen property was simultaneous." Id. at 
208 (emphasis added); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408. The State 
could not assume and "the evidence [did] not establish that 
defendant received the various stolen guns on separate 
occassions." Id. at 207. In any event, "proof of the date of 
the actual 'taking' does not necessarily establish the date of 
'receipt' for purposes of the charge of receiving stolen 
property . . . " 671 P.2d at 207. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the retention or 
possession of the same stolen property was a simultaneous "act" 
encompassing all of the charges arising out of the October 1, 
1994, episode. The trial court erred in assuming and the 
evidence did not establish that Mr. Williams had received or 
possessed "the .357 handgun before he loaded it and concealed it 
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in his vehicle." (R 137) (Amended Finding No. 3 is clearly 
erroneous, having no factual basis other than counsel's oral 
representations). Consequently, the court's conclusions which 
were based on Amended Finding No. 3 were also incorrect. See 
(R 138) (Conclusion Nos. 1, 2, 3). 
Instead, the charges of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous 
Weapon, Carrying a Loaded Firearm, and Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property were all based on the following facts: "On October 1, 
. . . police officers responded to a shots fired report. . . . 
The defendant was one of the people detained." (R 136) (Amended 
Finding No. 1). "Detective Cravens observed a sawed off shotgun 
in the back seat area of the [suspected] car through the car's 
rear window. A search of the car was performed . . . and a 
loaded .357 Magnum revolver was found under the driver's 
floormat. The defendant admitted that he was in possession of 
the .357 handgun and that the gun was 'probably stolen.'" (R 
137) (Amended Finding No. 2). The only "act" at issue is the 
discovery of the .357 revolver and the defendant's admission. 
The above act, however, does not justify the filing of 
three separate charges. No "voluntary bodily movement" or 
proven "act" distinguished one charge from another. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-1-402(1); 76-1-601(1). Because the same act 
"establish[ed] offenses which may be punished in different ways 
under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402 (1) . 
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Arguably, the act in question falls under the statutory 
proscriptions of each of the involved charges. See Salt Lake 
City Ordinance 11.48.040 (the "Carrying a Loaded Firearm" charge 
makes it " unlawful for any person to carry a loaded firearm in 
a vehicle . . . " ) ; Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.48.070 ("Carrying 
a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" makes it "unlawful for any person, 
. . . to carry . . . firearms . . . capable of causing death of 
serious bodily concealed upon his person"); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-408(1) ("Theft by Receiving Stolen Property" occurs "if 
he receives [or] retains . . . property of another knowing that 
it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been 
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the 
property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it"); 
see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (such a theft is a 
second degree felony if the "property stolen is a 
firearm . . .") . 
However, Mr. Williams has already accepted 
responsibility for his "act", having previously "pled guilty to 
one count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and one count 
of Carrying a Loaded Firearm." (R 137) (Amended Finding No. 6). 
His two guilty pleas, entered without formal representation, (R 
203),3 were arguably one conviction too many because of the 
3
 Mr. Williams did not receive the benefit of continual and 
formal assistance from an attorney, although at the time of the 
arraignment an attorney who had not been appointed to his case may 
have been briefly consulted. (R 203). 
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sameness of the underlying and simultaneous act. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(1); see also id. (under the single criminal episode 
statute, Mr. Williams' "act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision"). 
Mr. Williams was in fact punished. (R 212-16). The 
Theft by Receiving charge should have been dismissed. See also 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1) ("if a defendant has been 
prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a 
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if . . . [t]he subsequent prosecution is for an offense 
that was or should have been tried . . . [and] . . . [t]he 
former prosecution . . . resulted in conviction"); Utah R. Crim. 
P. 9.5(1) (emphasis added) ("Unless otherwise provided by law, . 
. . [an] information charging multiple offenses . . . arising 
from a single criminal episode . . . shall be filed in a single 
court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the 
highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged"); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-4 02 (2)4; see generally infra Point I.B. 
4
 The requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2) have also 
been met. Mr. Williams was subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses [the felony and misdemeanor offenses], (R 13 7) (Amended 
Findings 5 & 7) ; both offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court, the district court, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1); 
and the offenses were known to the prosecuting attorney at the time 
of arraignment on the first information. Mr. Williams' admission, 
"that he was in possession of the .357 handgun and that the gun was 
'probably stolen [,]" (R 137) (Amended Finding 2), was known on 
October 1, 1994, (R 9), and contained in the same police reports 
used by the prosecuting attorney to file both misdemeanor and 
felony charges. (R 43, 52, 101, 112). 
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B. RECENTLY ENACTED AUTHORITY REQUIRES 
INFORMATIONS TO BE FILED IN THE COURT WITH 
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CARRYING THE 
HIGHEST POSSIBLE PENALTY OF THE OFFENSES 
CHARGED 
The language of the single criminal episode statute 
overlaps in principle with the protections against double 
jeopardy. Cf. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 
1994) ("courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the 
case can be decided on other grounds"). The parties here do not 
dispute the existence of the double jeopardy protection, (R 
67-73; 76-82); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-1-6(2)(a); Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(5); Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 7; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, amend. V; rather, the 
issue concerns whether double jeopardy applies to the charges 
resulting from the October 1, 1994, incident. "[N]or shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense" is Utah's 
double jeopardy clause. Utah Const, art. I, § 12; accord U.S. 
Const, amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). State v. 
Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), is an opinion similar to, but 
distinguishable from, the present double jeopardy situation. 
In Sosa, the defendant was charged on June 6, 1977, "with 
the misdemeanors of carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle and 
possession of marijuana." 598 P.2d at 343. On June 29, 1977, a 
second information was filed in the district court charging him 
"with the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
person." Id. The misdemeanor charges were tried in the city 
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court and they resulted in two convictions. Id. Since the 
felony charge also ended up in a conviction, Sosa appealed it "on 
the grounds that the [felony] prosecution was barred by the 
'single criminal episode' provision of Utah's Criminal Code and 
in violation of the double jeopardy doctrine." Jd. (footnotes 
omitted). 
In analyzing Sosa's arguments on appeal, the majority 
opinion acknowledged that district courts "have general 
jurisdiction over all criminal matters including non-indictable 
misdemeanors." id. at 344. Despite its acknowledgment, however, 
the majority concluded that when city courts and district courts 
both have jurisdiction over a misdemeanor offense, the 
misdemeanor may be tried in the lower court because "venue [for 
the misdemeanor] has historically been held to lie in justice's 
and city courts." Id. 
The current rules and statutes, however, have replaced 
the historical and "legal right to insist that the action proceed 
in the proper venue." In contrast to a party's past right to 
insist that a misdemeanor action proceed in a city (now circuit) 
court, see id. (citing State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 
1034 (1941)), Utah authority now demands: 
(1)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, . . . 
informations charging multiple offenses, which may 
include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or 
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal 
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed 
in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged 
offense with the highest possible penalty of all the 
offenses charged. 
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(b) The offenses within the . . . information may 
not be separated except by order of the court and for 
good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is 
adjudicating the . . . information has jurisdicition 
over all the offenses charged, and a single 
prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5 (emphasis added) (Rule 9.5 is the current 
version of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9.5, which was enacted in 1989 
and later replaced verbatim by the rule). 
"On October 3, 1994, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's 
Office filed an Information charging [Mr. Williams] with one 
count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and two counts of 
Carrying a Loaded Firearm. Both charges are class B misdemeanor 
violations of the city ordinances." (R 137) (Amended Finding 
No. 5). "On October 4, 1994, the defendant was arraigned on the 
city charges in front of Judge Pro Tern Patrick Casey and pled 
guilty to one count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and 
one count of Carrying a Loaded Firearm. The third count was 
dismissed." (R 137) (Amended Finding No. 6). "On October 4, 
1994, Detective Cravens . . . screened charges of Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, and Carrying 
a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a class A misdemeanor, with the 
County Attorney's Office. The County Attorney issued an 
Information charging the defendant with Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property." (R 
137) (Amended Finding No. 7). 
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The corresponding court conclusion, that "the Circuit 
Court does not have jurisdiction over the second degree felony 
of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property[,]" (R 138) (Conclusion 
Nos. 5-6), misconstrues the focus of the rule. Rule 9.5 
mandates that "informations charging multiple offenses . . . 
shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the 
charged offense with the highest possible penalty of all the 
offenses charged." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5. Furthermore, even 
assuming that the "single court" mandate did not decide the 
matter, filing additional charges arising out of the same 
criminal episode still was precluded. See supra Point II. 
The court's rulings were in error and Mr. Williams was 
improperly required to again defend himself in district court 
after he already had entered two guilty pleas to the misdemeanor 
charges arising out of the same criminal episode. The felony 
conviction of theft by receiving stolen property should be 
reversed. 
C. THE INFLEXIBLE "SAME-ELEMENTS" FEDERAL 
STANDARD SHOULD BE ABANDONED AND REPLACED BY 
A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH UNDER UTAH'S 
CONSTITUTION 
During the proceedings below, the State argued and the 
court concluded, "The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property 
has different elements than the crimes of Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm." (R 13 8) 
(Amended Finding 4); see also (R 138) (Amended Finding 8) ("The 
crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is a separate and 
distinct crime from the crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous 
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Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm"). The elements are set 
forth below. 
Theft by Receiving Stolen Property", Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-4 08, states in pertinent part, "A person commits theft if he 
receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing 
that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been 
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding the property from the owner knowing the 
property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it." 
Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) (such a theft 
is a second degree felony if the "property stolen is a 
firearm . . . " ) . The "Carrying a Loaded Firearm" provision, Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 11.48.040, reads, "It is unlawful for any 
person to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any public 
street within the corporate limits of the city." Id. The 
relevant section of the "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" 
provision, Salt Lake City Ordinace 11.48.040, makes it "unlawful 
for any person . . . to carry concealed on his person any 
dangerous weapon with the intent or the purpose to use the same 
to . . . injure another person, ..." Id. Violations of either 
Salt Lake City Ordinance is a class B misdemeanor. (R 13 7) 
(Amended Finding 5). 
A "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" class A 
misdemeanor charge was also filed because it prohibited, "Any 
person . . . [from] carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, . . . 
except that a firearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed 
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in a case, gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be 
considered a concealed weapon, but . . . [i]f the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he shall be guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504. The 
"Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" class A misdemeanor 
charge was later dropped, though, as "the County Attorney learned 
about the defendant's guilty plea to the city charges . . . " 
(R 13 7) (Amended Finding 8). 
A review of the above statutes indicates that each 
offense is different. As a matter of federal law, the double 
jeopardy bar does not apply since "each offense contains an 
element not contained in the other[.]" United States v. Dixon, 
509 U.S. , 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 569, 113 S.Ct. (1993) 
(construing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932)). As a matter of state constitutional law, however, the 
question remains open. (R 73) .5 
5
 While State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), cited the 
federal and state constitutions, id. at 345, the text of Utah's 
Constitution has since been changed. Compare Utah Const, art. 
VIII, § 7 ("The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, 
and not prohibited by law"), with Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 ("The 
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to 
issue all extraordinary writs") . Instead of limiting jurisdiction, 
in 1989, the legislature enacted a statute which required multiple 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode to "be filed in 
a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with 
the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-9.5. This statutory authority, since repealed 
but promulgated into a rule, see Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5, had the 
effect of eviscerating Sosa's rationale. No appellate opinions 
have interpreted Rule 9.5, leaving open its impact under a (new) 
state constitutional analysis. Other opinions have "nominally" 
referred to Utah's double jeopardy clause, see, e.g., Duran v. 
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In support of his state constitutional law argument, 
Mr. Williams acknowledged Dixon, but noted its confusing and 
unprincipled approach. (R 73); see also Albernaz v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (characterizing the law of 
double jeopardy as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail 
to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator"). For 
example, under the federal standard Mr. Williams could have been 
prosecuted for both the class B misdemeanor charge of "Carrying a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon" provision, Salt Lake City Ordinace 
11.48.040, and for the class A misdemeanor charge of "Carrying a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon". Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504. 
Even though no additional or different facts were alleged 
(the same police reports were used for filing both offenses), the 
elements for each "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" charge 
were different. See Salt Lake City Ordinace 11.48.040 (requiring 
the elements of intent to injure and concealment on his person 
[as opposed to in the car], both of which are absent from its 
Utah Code counterpart); c£. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (requiring 
the element of a gun containing ammunition which is not 
necessarily in its City Ordinance counterpart). To avoid the 
absurdity of a such dual "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" 
convictions under the impractical federal standard, (R 73), the 
Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 (Utah App. 1990) (citing McNair v. Havward, 666 
P. 2d 321 (Utah 1983)), although none of those opinions analyzed the 
clause in the manner suggested here. The 1993 Dixon concurring and 
dissenting opinions, together with the 1990 Grady opinion, also 
present additional considerations not previously analyzed under 
Utah's Constitution. 
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better approach should recognize the guidelines set forth in 
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), and in the concurring and 
dissenting opinion of United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. , 125 
L.Ed.2d 556, 569, 113 S.Ct. (1993) (accompanying the 
government's appeal in Dixon was a companion case appealed by a 
defendant). 
In Grady. the Court held "that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential 
element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government 
will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the 
defendant has already been prosecuted." 495 U.S. at 510. While 
the traditional Blockburger test is an appropriate starting 
point, "If application of that test reveals that the offenses 
have identical statutory elements or that one is a lesser 
included offense of the other, then the inquiry must cease, and 
the subsequent prosecution is barred." .Id. at 516. In short, 
"Even if two offenses are sufficiently different to permit the 
imposition of consecutive sentences, successive prosecutions will 
be barred in some circumstances where the second prosecution 
requires the relitigation of factual issues already resolved by 
the first." Id. at 519 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 
166-67 n.6 (1977)). 
A mere three years passed before Grady was overruled by 
a majority opinion in Dixon,6 which adhered strictly to the 
6
 The members of the Gradv majority opinion changed 
dramatically in three years, with the dissenting opinion in Grady 
now able to muster a majority for the Dixon opinion. See Grady v. 
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rigid Blockburger test. Dixon was not without critism, however, 
as evidenced by its accompanying concurring and dissenting 
opinions: 
The same-elements test [of Blockburger! is an 
inadequate safeguard, for it leaves the 
constitutional guarantee at the mercy of a 
legislature's decision to modify statutory 
definitions. Significantly, therefore, this 
Court has applied an inflexible version of the 
same-elements test only once, in 1911, in a 
successive prosecution case, and has since noted 
that "[t]he Blockburger test is not the only 
standard for determining whether successive 
prosecutions impermissibly involve the same 
offense." 
Dixon, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 593 (White & Stevens, J.J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 586 
(citations omitted) ("To subject an individual to repeated 
prosecutions exposes him to 'embarrassment, expense and ordeal,' 
violates principles of finality, and increases the risk of a 
mistaken conviction"). 
In another concurring and dissenting opinion in Dixon, 
Justice Souter explained "that Grady was correctly decided," and 
relied heavily on a case arising out of Utah, In re Nielsen, 131 
U.S. 176 (1889). See Dixon, 125 L.Ed.2d at 599, 602 (Souter & 
Stevens, J.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part): 
The recognition that a Blockburger rule is 
insufficient protection against successive 
prosecution can be seen as long ago as In re 
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 33 L.Ed. 118, 9 S.Ct. 672 
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruleld by United States v. Dixon, 
509 U.S. ---, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 569, 113 S.Ct. --- (1993). 
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(1889), where we held that conviction for one 
statutory offense precluded later prosecution for 
another, even though each required proof of a 
fact the other did n o t . . . . [T]he Court held 
that a conviction of a Mormon on a charge of 
cohabiting with his two wives over a 2 1/2-year 
period barred a subsequent prosecution for 
adultery with one of them on the day following 
the end of that period. . . . [S]trict 
application of the Blockburaer test would have 
permitted imposition of consecutive sentences. . 
. . [C]onviction for adultery required proof 
that the defendant had sexual intercourse with 
one woman while married to another; conviction 
for cohabitation required proof that the 
defendant lived with more than one woman at the 
same time. Nonetheless, the Court . . . held the 
separate offenses to be the 'same.' 
Dixon, 125 L.Ed.2d at 602, 605-66 (Souter & Stevens, J.J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(citations omitted). Accordingly, "Grady did nothing more than 
apply a version of the Nielsen rule." Id. at 608. 
The principles of Nielsen and Grady should be adopted as 
a matter of state constitutional law. Rather than trying to 
apply the inflexible Dixon standard, Utah's historical background 
should be kept in perspective. Cf. Society of Separationists, 
Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993) ("We have 
encouraged parties briefing state constitutional issues to use 
historical and textual evidence, . . . to assist us in arriving 
at a proper interpretation of the provision in question"). 
Since many of the framers of Utah's Constitution were 
former polygamists, see Flynn, Federalism and Viable State 
Government--The History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L.Rev. 
311, the 1889 Nielsen principle would have been more in accord 
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with the intent behind the 1886 state constitution than "same-
elements" federal standard announced by Dixon. See also 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (historical "evidence can help in 
divining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect 
of any constitutional interpretation"). 
Hence, notwithstanding the conclusion that, "The crime of 
Theft by Receiving Stolen Property has different elements than 
the crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying 
a Loaded Firearm [,]" (R 138) (Amended Finding 4); (R 138) 
(Amended Finding 8), "[e]ven if two offenses are sufficiently 
different to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences, 
successive prosecutions will be barred in some circumstances 
where the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual 
issues already resolved by the first." Grady, 495 U.S. at 519 
(quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977)). 
Such a second prosecution should be barred in Mr. 
Williams case as there is an identical relitigation of factual 
issues already resolved by the first misdemeanor prosecution. 
Although "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" was not 
prosecuted as both as a class A and class B misdemeanor, the same 
police reports and factual contentions served as the basis for 
those charges and every other charge filed against Mr. Williams. 
The "Theft by Receiving" charge requires proof of retaining or 
concealing a firearm, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408; 
-412(1) (a) (ii), as do the charges of "Carrying a Loaded Firearm" 
and "Carrying a Concealed Weapon." Salt Lake City Ordinances 
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11.48.040, -.070. "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars a 
subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of 
an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove 
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has 
already been prosecuted." Grady, 495 U.S. at 510. The court 
erred in not dismissing the "Theft by Receiving" charge. (R 13 8-
39) . 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Williams respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the lower court's denial of his motion to dismiss the theft by 
receiving charge. 
SUBMITTED this 17- day of May, 1995. 
5-
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ELIZABETH HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec- 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sec. 7. [Jurisdiction of district courts.] 
The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by 
law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, and 
a supervisory control of the same. The District Courts or any judge 
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, 
injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and other writs necessary 
to carry into effect their orders, judgments and decrees, and to give 
them a general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their 
respective jurisdictions. 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Art. VIII, § 5 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by stat-
ute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme 
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
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Pule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after t ie date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
*hall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Ob) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeaL If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not pntAr fi«Hi«fro **• A*~+ ~ - J 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special 
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part 
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings 
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all pro-
ceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement 
of any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply 
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such 
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings 
therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administra-
tive board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure 
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or incon-
sistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall 
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in sin-
gle court. 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informa-
tions charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state 
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arising from a sin-
gle criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest 
possible penalty of all the offenses charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not 
be separated except by order of the court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is abjudicating the com-
plaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, 
and a single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another 
appeal may be, and is, timely taken. 
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the 
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails 
to appear for oral argument. 
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals 
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided. 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of 
offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single 
criminal episode means all conduct which is closely related in time and is 
uiodent to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
nnSr^- m this part shan be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 
77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent pros-
ecution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a 
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have 
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in 
a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury* means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily iiyury, or a facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the 
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
maimer that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, govern-
ment, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily iiyury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) Aperson commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or beUeving that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. . 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; , . , ,.
 i V 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged;
 m 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or , , 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
Pr(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(0 as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) 
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-
408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon. 
(1) Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503 and 
those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dan-
gerous weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
except that a forearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a case, 
gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon, 
but: 
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains no ammunition, 
he shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he 
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; or 
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off shotgun, or if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall be 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons de-
scribed in Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of residence, place 
of business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall be 
a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant* 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) Tb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) Tb receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) Tb testify in his own behalf; 
(d) Tb be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) Tb have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) Tb a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) Tb the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) Tb be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
77-35-9.5. Rule 9.5 — Charged multiple of-
fenses — To be filed in single court. 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, com-
plaints, citations, or informations charging mul-
tiple offenses, which may include violations of 
state laws, coimty ordinances, or municipal ordi-
^ ^ T a n d M i s i n g f r o m a single criminal episode 
as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged 
offense with the highest possible penalty of all 
the offenses charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, 
or information may not be separated except by 
order of the court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is 
adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information 
has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a 
single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the of-
fenLs. 1989 
ii.4o.u4u. carrying Loaaeo rirearm 
Prohibited. 
A. Carrying Loaded Firearm in Vehicle or on 
Street. It is unlawful for any person to carry a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any public street 
within the corporate limits of the city. 
B. Definition. A firearm is deemed to be 
loaded when: 
1. There is an unexpended cartridge, shell or 
projectile in the firing position, except in the case 
of pistols and revolvers; 
2. Revolvers and pistols shall be deemed 
loaded when the unexpended cartridge, shell or 
projectile is in a position that the manual 
operation of any mechanism once would cause the 
unexpended cartridge, shell or projectile to be 
fired; and 
3. A muzzle-loading firearm is capped or 
primed and has a powder charge and ball or shot 
in the barrel or cylinders. (Prior code $ 32-6-6.1) 
11.48.070. Concealed Weapons. 
A. It is unlawful for any person, except a 
peace officer, to carry any slingshot, brass 
knuckles, firearms, daggers, stiletto, nunchaku 
stick, or any other instrument or object capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury concealed 
upon his person. 
B. It is unlawful for any person, except a 
peace officer, to carry concealed on his person any 
dangerous weapon with the intent or the purpose 
to use the same to harm, maim or injure another 
person, animal or thing. For the purpose of this 
subsection: 
1. "Dangerous weapon" means any item that, 
in the manner of its use or intended use, is capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury; and 
2. In construing whether or not an object or 
tiling not commonly known as a dangerous 
weapon is a dangerous weapon, the character of 
the wound produced, if any, and the manner in 
which the instrument, object or thing was used or 
intended to be used, are factors which the court 
shall take into account in deciding the question. 
(Prior code § 32-6-3) 
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Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and 
Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss 
Case No. 941901462FS 
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson 
This matter came on for hearing on November 17, 1994. The 
State was represented by Richard Hamp. The defendant was present 
and was represented by Elizabeth Hunt. The Court considered 
memoranda, cases submitted by the parties, materials submitted by 
defense counsel regarding the filing of a city and a state case 
against Mr. Williams, and argument by counsel. Now being fully 
apprised in the matter, the Court denies the defendant's motion 
and enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 3, 1994, Jason Williams was charged by Salt Lake 
City in a three count information with two counts of carrying a 
loaded firearm, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 
11.48.040, and one count of carrying a concealed weapon, in 
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.40.070 in Salt Lake City 
ft ft n n Q fi 
v. Jason Williams, case number 941016768. 
2. He was arraigned on October 4, 1994, and pled to one count 
of carrying a loaded firearm and one count of carrying a 
concealed weapon. 
3. He was sentenced by Judge Pro Tern T. Patrick Casey on 
November 2, 1994. 
4. In this case, the State filed an information on October 4, 
1994, charging Mr. Williams with theft by receiving stolen 
property, a violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-409, and 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a violation of Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-10-504. 
5. The State subsequently moved to dismiss the count alleging 
carrying a concealed weapon, and the motion was granted. 
6. Both cases are premised on facts allegedly occurring on 
October 1, 1994, wherein the police conducted a warrantless 
search of a car containing two loaded firearms. 
7. Both cases were filed in the Third Circuit Court before 
Judge Pro Tern T. Patrick Casey. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Because the elements of the offenses in the City case are 
different from the elements of the offense charged in the State 
case, there is no violation of the defendant's rights against 
double jeopardy. 
2. Because the offenses charged in the City case and the 
offense charged in the State case did not occur in the same 
criminal episode, there is no violation of the Utah statutes 
pertaining to prosecutions of single criminal episodes. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing, the Court 
hereby orders that the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. 
DATED this day of November, 1994. 
By the Court: 
THE HONORABLE 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
RICHARD HAMP 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of this motion 
to Deputy County Attorney this day of . 1994, 
flonoas 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RICHARD G. HAMP. Bar No. 4048 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V. 
JASON SCOTT WILLIAMS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
I OF LAW 
1 CaseNo.941901462FS 
i Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above case was set for hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on November 
17, 1994, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge. The Plaintiff, the 
State of Utah, was represented by Richard G. Hamp, Deputy County Attorney, and the 
Defendant, Jason Scott Williams, was represented by his attorney, Elizabeth Hunt. Written 
memoranda and oral argument was presented to the Court. The Court being fully advised hereby 
finds the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 1, 1994, Detective Kent Cravens of the Metro Gang Unit and other police 
officers responded to a shots fired report. Five members of the gangs "QVO" or "BMG" were 
detained by the police officers. The defendant was one of the people detained. 
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2. A 1981 silver Datsun 310 car was parked nearby. The defendant had driven the car to 
the area. Detective Cravens observed a sawed off shotgun in the back seat area of the car 
through the car's rear window. A search of the car was performed by Detective Cravens and a 
loaded .357 Magnum revolver was found under the driver's floormat. The defendant admitted 
that he was in possession of the .357 handgun and that the gun was "probably stolen." The .357 
Magnum was not listed on NCIC as stolen at this time. 
3. The defendant received and took possession of the .357 handgun before he loaded it 
and concealed it in his vehicle. 
4. The defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt Lake County Jail for Possession 
of a Concealed Weapon and Possession of a Loaded Firearm in a Vehicle. Both of these charges 
were misdemeanor Salt Lake City ordinance violations. 
5. On October 3, 1994, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office filed an Information 
charging Scott Wilkerson, an alias of the defendant, with one count of Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon and two counts of Carrying a Loaded Firearm. Both charges are class B 
misdemeanor violations of the city ordinances. 
6. On October 4, 1994, the defendant was arraigned on the city charges in front of Judge 
Pro Tern Patrick Casey and pled guilty to one count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon 
and one count of Carrying a Loaded Firearm. The third count was dismissed. 
7. On October 4, 1994, Detective Cravens checked the NCIC listings again and the .357 
Magnum was listed as stolen. Detective Cravens screened charges of Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property, a second degree felony, and Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a class A 
misdemeanor, with the County Attorney's Office. The County Attorney issued an Information 
charging the defendant with Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Theft by Receiving 
Stolen Property. 
8. On October 11, 1994, the County Attorney learned about the defendant's guilty plea to 
the city charges and dismissed the class A carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon charge. 
0 0 0 1 3 7 
9. A preliminary hearing was held before Judge Pro Tern Patrick Casey on October 18, 
1994, and the defendant was bound over to the district court on the second degree felony charge 
of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was committed and completed when 
the defendant took possession of the stolen .357 Magnum handgun. 
2. The crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm occurred and were completed when the defendant loaded and concealed the .357 
Magnum handgun in the car that he was driving. 
3. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was completed before the defendant 
committed the crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm. 
4. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property has different elements than the 
crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm. 
5. The jurisdiction for the second degree Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is in the 
District Court. The Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction over the second degree felony of 
Theft by Receiving Stolen Property. 
6. The Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the 
second degree felony Theft by Receiving Stolen Property charge. Jurisdiction to prosecute this 
offense was only in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
7. The offense of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was not known to the prosecution 
at the time that the Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon charges were filed. 
8. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is a separate and distinct crime from 
the crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm. 
000138 
9. The defendant was not placed in double jeopardy under the clauses of either the 
Utah State Consitution or the Federal Constitution. 
10. The crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm were not committed as part of the same criminal episode as the crime of Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property within the meaning of Section 76-1-402, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
as Amended. 
_^ day of Deeembcrr DATED this ^ Sciuii u, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Elizabeth Hunt 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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BY. 
ELIZABETH HUNT #5292 
Attorney for Mr. Williams 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
KrJiY CLLRK 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JASON SCOTT WILLIAMS 
Defendant. 
Objections to State's 
Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law 
Case No. 941900S£*FS 
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant, Jason Scott Williams, hereby objects to 
the State's amended findings of fact and conclusions of law, a 
copy of which is attached. 
As a general matter, the proposed findings exceed the 
evidence and the Court's analysis. Aside from the court dockets, 
the only items of evidence presented for the Court's 
consideration on the motion were the police reports submitted by 
defense counsel. 
Mr. Williams objects to the following specific 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
7. There was no evidence presented regarding when 
Detective Cravens verified that the gun was stolen on NCIC, or 
when he screened the case with the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
office. 
8. There was no evidence presented regarding when the 
County Attorney learned about Mr. Williams plea to the city 
charges. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The crime of theft by receiving property was 
occurring at the same time as the city misdemeanor weapons 
offenses. Both the State and City Informations charge October 1, 
1994. Both Count I of the information in the State case and the 
probable cause statement refer to the facts on October lf 1994 at 
975 South and 300 West. 
2. The crime of carrying a loaded firearm was 
occurring on October 1, 1994, the same time as the theft by 
receiving. It appears that the crime of carrying a concealed 
weapon never occurred in this case, inasmuch as there is no 
evidence that Mr. Williams carried the gun on his person. Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 11.48.070. 
3. The crimes alleged in the city and state cases 
were occurring simultaneously on October 1, 1994. 
4. The circuit court magistrates had initial 
jurisdiction over both the city and state charges, and the 
district court had ultimate jurisdiction over the charges in both 
cases• 
5. While the city prosecutor's office had 
discretionary jurisdiction over the city charges, the state 
prosecutor's office had jurisdiction over all charges 
contemplated in the city and state cases. 
6. The prosecution had all the evidence necessary to 
the theft by receiving charge at the time that the other 
misdemeanor charges were filed. 
Mr. Williams has no objection to the proposed court 
order submitted by the state. 




Elil aBeth "I^i  
Attorney for Mr. Williams 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of this motion 
Is day of to the Deputy County Attorney thi 1994. 
